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College Admission with Multidimensional Privileges: The
Brazilian Affirmative Action Case
By Orhan Aygu¨n and Ina´cio Bo´∗
In 2012 Brazilian public universities were mandated to use affir-
mative action policies for candidates from racial and income mi-
norities. We show that the policy makes the students’ affirmative
action status a strategic choice, and may reject high-achieving mi-
nority students while admitting low-achieving majority students.
Empirical data shows evidence consistent with this type of unfair-
ness in more than 49% of the programs. We propose a selection
criterion and an incentive-compatible mechanism that, for a wider
range of similar problems and the one in Brazil in particular, re-
moves any gain from strategizing over the privileges claimed and
is fair.
JEL: C78, D63, D78, D82
Keywords: Mechanism design, matching with contracts, college ad-
missions, affirmative action, diversity.
I. Introduction
Following an increasing need for affirmative action for students of African de-
scent and of low-income families in terms of access to public universities, in Au-
gust 2012 the Brazilian congress enacted a law1 establishing the implementation
of a series of affirmative action policies throughout the federal higher education
system.2 Since then, these policies have had a significant impact on the lives of
hundreds of thousands of students who join its undergraduate programs every
year.
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1Brazilian federal law 12.711 of August 29, 2012.
2For detailed information on the history of affirmative action in Brazil, see Moehlecke (2002).
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The law established that certain proportions of the students accepted into each
program in those institutions3 should have studied in public high-schools, come
from a low-income family, and/or belong to a racial minority. This objective
was implemented by partitioning the seats in each program, reserving them for
different combinations of these characteristics. Some seats, for example, were
reserved for those who claim coming from a public high-school and from a low-
income minority, while other seats were reserved for those who claim coming from
a public high-school and belonging to a racial minority, etc. The students with
the highest grades in a national exam, for each group of seats, would then be
accepted into the program.
In this paper we show that, while the method proposed by the government
makes the cohorts of students satisfy ratios specified in the law, it has some
important deficiencies. First, it is unfair in the sense that it may reject high-
achieving students who are the target of the affirmative action policies while
accepting low-achieving students who do not have privilege priority status. For
example, a low-income minority student with a high exam grade may be rejected
while a high-income white student with a low exam grade is accepted. This is
not just a theoretical observation: our analysis of the cutoff grades in the 2013
admissions shows evidence consistent with unfairness in the assignments in about
49% of the more than 3,000 programs available. Second, it gives an advantage to
students who strategize over the privileges that they claim. A student who
makes that choice based on good information about other students’ choices and
their exam grades can improve their chances of being accepted at their preferred
programs.
We show how the problems that we observe in the data and in the incentive
properties of the procedure currently being used come from a combination of two
factors. First, it treats differently students who are eligible to claim a set of
privileges from students who could credibly act as if they were eligible for them.
For example, if a seat gives priority to students who claim low income but not
minority privileges over those who claim both, then a student who is low income
and a minority could benefit by not claiming her minority privilege. Second, it
seems to have in its design the implicit assumption that students who are eligible
3In Brazil, as in many other countries including Turkey (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999), students apply
directly to the university for a specific program whereas in other countries, like the US, students simply
apply to the university and, once accepted, must then choose the majors or programs to pursue.
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to claim privileges have lower grades than those who are not. More specifically, if
low-income students always have lower grades than those who are not low-income,
and likewise for minorities and students from public HS, the procedure being used
in Brazil would not suffer from any of the shortcomings we identify.
Based on these and other insights that we obtain from our application, we
provide a new choice procedure to be used by the programs that eliminates the
problems above. It does so by guaranteeing that no student could be worse off by
claiming additional privileges. Moreover, we show that the choice function that is
defined by that procedure can be combined with the cumulative offer mechanism
to provide a strategy-proof mechanism for matching students to programs under
the proposed policies.
This paper is related to the literature on affirmative action in college admissions
and school choice mechanisms. The incorporation of affirmative action policies
into those mechanisms, in the form of majority quotas,4 has already been studied
in early papers on the use of centralized mechanisms for school choice and college
admissions (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003; Abdulkadirog˘lu, 2005). Hafalir,
Yenmez and Yildirim (2013) present an alternative method for implementing
affirmative action, denoted minority reserves. With minority reserves, schools
or colleges give higher priority to minority students up to the point where the
minorities fill the reserves. They show that the use of these reserves, as opposed
to maximum quotas, leads to a Pareto improvement for the students.5
Kojima (2012) showed, however, that the use of affirmative action in the form
of majority quotas may paradoxically hurt every minority student. Dog˘an (2016),
moreover, showed that this problem is also present when using minority reserves:
the introduction of those policies can make all minority students weakly worse
off. Moreover, the author shows that these situations are not rare cases, but are
indeed pervasive.
The kind of policy that we evaluate in this paper is closely related to the concept
of minority reserves, in that seats in university programs give a higher priority
to certain types of students, leaving those seats available to other students when
those are not occupied. Similarly to Kojima (2012) and Dog˘an (2016), we show
that the method used in Brazil also leads to perverse effects that may also hurt the
4That is, an upper bound on the number of “majority” students who can be matched to a school or
college.
5Generalizations of the use of minority reserves for multiple types of affirmative action objectives are
also present in the soft-bound quotas for multiple types in Ehlers et al. (2014) and Bo (2016).
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intended beneficiaries of these policies. Differently from their cases, however, the
problem here is a consequence of a miscoordination that is caused by the fact that
the procedure we evaluate makes the privileges a strategic variable. Moreover,
to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to provide empirical evidence
consistent with those negative effects.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section II we present the
mechanism suggested by the ministry of education and currently used by the uni-
versities surveyed. In section III we introduce the matching with contracts model
that we apply to the college admissions problem with multidimensional privileges,
and define the desirable properties that a procedure for selecting students into
programs should satisfy. In section IV we show that the currently used Brazil
Reserves choice function induces a game in which strategically sophisticated stu-
dents may obtain better outcomes by strategizing over which privileges to claim.
We show that there is a trade-off between fairness and a legalistic interpretation
of the affirmative action objectives, which is embedded in the Brazil Reserves
procedure. Moreover, while the current procedure satisfies the latter, it comes at
the cost of the former and also of bad incentives. Section V provides empirical
evidence on how the situations that lead to those problems were pervasive in the
year 2013. In section VI, we introduce the multidimensional privileges choice
function, which provides a general solution for problems with multidimensional
reserves, and we apply it to the Brazilian case. Moreover, we build upon the
choice function defined to describe a mechanism – the student-proposing stable
mechanism – that matches students to colleges using a centralized system, satisfies
stability, is strategy-proof, and fair. All the proofs are given in the Appendix.
II. The Ministry of Education’s Guidelines
For the most part, until 2010 college admissions in Brazil essentially worked in
a decentralized way. Students first applied to a specific program at each univer-
sity of their choice (e.g., history at the University of Brasilia or biology at the
Federal University of Minas Gerais). Then, by using a combination of grades in
a national exam and sometimes exams particular to those programs, the univer-
sities ranked them and accepted the top applicants to each program up to the
programs’ capacities, putting the remaining ones on waiting lists. Among those
accepted, typically some would not enroll because they had also been accepted for
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COLLEGE ADMISSION WITH MULTIDIMENSIONAL PRIVILEGES 5
admission at another university. The universities would then proceed to a second
round, accepting students from the wait list following their ranking. Depending
on the university, this might be followed by a third, fourth, or more rounds.
The law introducing the use of affirmative action in the access to the federal
universities did not change the decentralized nature of the entire system itself, but
it has changed the rules the universities use to choose among students who apply
to them, in an attempt to satisfy the affirmative action objectives. Although
since 2010 an increasing number of universities and students have been using
a centralized mechanism to determine the students’ matches, our analysis and
proposals can be applied to improve both decentralized and centralized systems.
6
The law established that 50% of the seats in each program offered by federal
universities should have its access determined by affirmative action policies. In
order to have higher priority access to those seats, a student must complete three
years of high school at a public institution. When assigning students to at least
50% of those seats, the university should also give higher priority to students
who claim belonging to a low-income family (and provide documented proof).
Additionally, when assigning a number of seats in the same proportion as the
aggregate number of African and native Brazilian descendents (referred to here
as “minorities”) in the state in which the institution is, the university should
give higher priority to students who claim being a minority. Since the status
associated with these claims constitute a special right that they have, we say that
those students claim specific privileges, and we denote these as “public HS
privilege,” “low-income privilege,” and “minority privilege.”
In a state where minorities constitute 25% of the population, a program with 80
seats will have 40 seats, for example, giving higher priority to students claiming
public HS privilege. At least 20 of those should give a higher priority to those
claiming low-income privilege, and 10 for those claiming minority privilege.
One key distinctive issue presented by the privileges proposed in the law is the
fact that they are multidimensional. That is, students may well belong to one or
more of the groups specified. For instance, a low-income white student from a
public high school would qualify for the low-income and public HS privileges, but
6More specifically, our solution will say how universities should decide which students to choose when
facing a pool of applicants, which is the typical case when universities select students in a decentralized
way. That same solution, however, can be the criterion for selecting from students in an algorithm that
is used to produce allocations in a centralized system.
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not for the minority privilege.
In October of the same year, Brazil’s Ministry of Education published an or-
dinance7 specifying some details on the implementation of the affirmative action
law as well as a suggested mechanism for choosing students while satisfying those
policies. Starting in the student selection processes of 2013, those recommenda-
tions were widely adopted as the new selection criteria. We denote these rules
proposed by the government to determine the set of students to be chosen from
any set of applicants as the class of Brazil Reserves Choice Functions (or simply
Brazil Reserves). It suggests that the seats for each program should be split into
five subsets. Let r be the proportion of minorities in the population of the state in
which the program is. For any program with capacity q, the five distinct subsets
are:
• A set with
⌈
q
4r
⌉
seats which gives priority to students who claim public HS,
minority, and low-income privileges.
• A set with
⌈
q
4 (1− r)
⌉
seats which gives priority to students who claim
public HS and low-income privileges only.
• A set with
⌈
q
4r
⌉
seats which gives priority to students who claim public HS
and minority privileges only.
• A set with
⌈
q
4 (1− r)
⌉
seats which gives priority to students who claim
public HS privilege only.
• A set with the remaining seats.
Given the students who apply for each of these subsets, those better ranked in
the entrance exam are accepted up to the capacity of the set. It is easy to see
that if there are enough applicants for each of those sets, the affirmative action
objectives, as described by the law, are satisfied. If the number of students who
apply for some of those sets is smaller than their capacity, those seats will be
filled following different priority structures, which are detailed in the Appendix.
We denote any procedure for selecting students that follows the criteria above as
an implementation of Brazil Reserves.
7Normative ordinance 18 of October 11, 2012.
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III. Model
There are finite sets S = {s1, . . . , sn} and P = {p1, . . . , pℓ} of students and
programs. Each program p has its own capacity qp. Each student s has a vector
of exam grades θ (s) = (θp1 (s) , . . . , θpℓ (s)) such that θp (s) indicates the grade of
student s in program p. There are no ties in the exam grades of each program, that
is, for any two students s, s′ ∈ S and program p ∈ P , θp(s) = θp(s
′) ⇐⇒ s = s′.
Each student s has a vector of available privileges she can claim, ts =
(
ths , t
m
s , t
i
s
)
where ths , t
m
s , t
i
s represents public HS, minority, and low-income privileges, respec-
tively, and complete strict preferences (≻∗s)s∈S over programs in P and remaining
unmatched, represented by ∅. We assume that students are indifferent between
the vectors of privileges claimed and only care about which program (if any) they
are matched to. This is justified mainly by the fact that no benefit or assistance
given by the university is associated with the privileges claimed, and that the
privileges claimed are not made public.
Each element of ts is binary, where 1 means that the student is eligible for
the privilege. This notation allows us to make ordering comparisons between
vectors of privileges: if t∗ is such that t∗ ≥ (1, 0, 0), for example, then t∗ ∈
{(1, 0, 0) , (1, 1, 0) , (1, 0, 1) , (1, 1, 1)}. To reduce confusion, we will typically rep-
resent this vector by using lowercase and uppercase letters, so (1, 0, 1) will be
represented by (H,m, I), for example. For each combination of privileges, a pro-
gram may reserve some seats for those claiming them. For example, Q
(H,m,i)
p is
the set of seats reserved for students who claim public HS privileges. Also, when
referring to those seats, we denote by qtp the number of seats in Q
t
p. Following the
ministry of education guidelines, therefore, q
(H,m,i)
p =
⌈
q
4 (1− rp)
⌉
, where rp is the
proportion of minorities in the state where program p is. In the Brazilian system,
if a student claims public HS, minority or low-income privileges she is required
to provide documental proof related to those classifications.8 Therefore, some
students may opt to not claim a privilege associated with a group she belongs to,
but students who do not belong to a group (and therefore do not have any proof
of belonging to it) are unable to claim that privilege.
For simplicity, we will make use of the matching with contracts (Hatfield and
8Unlike the public HS and low-income privileges, in order to claim minority privileges a student only
has to identify herself as a minority. Therefore, in principle, it is possible for a white student to declare
herself a minority (Ritter, 2018). This possibility, however, is ignored in this paper.
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Milgrom, 2005) notation.9 In this context, a contract x is a tuple (s, p, t), where
s ∈ S, p ∈ P and t represents the set of privileges the student is claiming. A
contract (s, p, t) is valid if t ≤ ts. For a contract x; xS , xP and xT represent
the student, the program, and the vector of privileges that student s is claiming
in contract x, respectively. Let X be the set of all valid contracts. For ease
of notation, for a set of contracts Y , Yi is the subset of Y that contains only
the contracts that include i ∈ S ∪ P . Similarly, Yt is the subset of Y that only
contains the contract with the privilege vector t. We denote by Xi,t the set of
contracts that include i and the privilege vector t. Let s(Y ), moreover, be the
set of students with contracts in Y , that is, s(Y ) = {s ∈ S : ∃(s, p, t) ∈ Y }. A
feasible allocation is a set of contracts X ′ ⊂ X, such that for every s ∈ S and
every p ∈ P , |X ′s| ≤ 1 and |X
′
p| ≤ qp. Let χ be the set of all possible feasible
allocations.
The null contract, meaning that the student has no contract, is also denoted
by ∅. A contract is acceptable if it is preferred to the null contract. While stu-
dents have preferences over programs, we need to translate them into preferences
over contracts. We denote these preferences, for each student s, by s. These
preferences are complete over Xs and are derived in such a way as to make them
consistent with the relation ≻∗s, and the assumption that students only care about
the program they are matched to:
∀s ∈ S, ∀p, p′ ∈ P and t, t′ ≤ ts : (s, p, t) ≻s (s, p
′, t′) ⇐⇒ p ≻∗s p
′
∀s ∈ S, ∀p ∈ P and t, t′ ≤ ts : (s, p, t) ∼s (s, p, t
′)
Next, the choice function of program p, Cp : 2
X → 2X is such that for Y ⊂ X,
Cp(Y ) ⊂ Yp. The set Cp(Y ) has a cardinality of at most qp and has at most one
contract per student.
The choice functions that we will present in this paper are all instances of
choice functions using slot-specific priorities, described in Kominers and So¨nmez
(2016). Under slot-specific priorities, each seat in a program has its own priority
ordering over contracts. Given a set of contracts, each seat “accepts” the top
9While it would be possible for us to formulate our problem (and solution) in terms of the matching
with complex constraints presented in Westkamp (2013), due to the simplicity of the representation of
the entire argument in terms of slots and contracts, we opted to follow that model.
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contract with respect to that seat’s priority ordering, among those which have
not yet been accepted. As shown in that paper, the set of contracts accepted may
depend on the order in which those seats are filled, and therefore that order is
also a parameter of the problem.
More specifically, under slot-specific priorities, each seat i in a program p has
its own priority order ◮ip over elements of X, and each program p has an order
of precedence over its seats ⊲p. The interpretation of i ⊲p i′ is that, whenever
possible, the program p fills seat i before filling i′. When filling seat i in program p,
the contract with the highest priority with respect to ◮ip, among those available,
is chosen. As we will show, this model is rich enough for us to represent both the
current procedures being used and our proposed solution.
Let Φ be the set of all strict preferences over P and Θs =
{
t ∈ {0, 1}3 : t ≤ ts
}
be the set of privilege vectors that student s can claim. A mechanism is the
strategy space ∆s = Φ × Θs for each student s along with an outcome function
ψ :
∏
s∈S
∆s → χ that selects an allocation for each strategy vector
∏
s∈S
δs ∈
∏
s∈S
∆s.
Given a student s and a strategy δs ∈ ∆s, let δ−s denote the strategy of all
students except student s. Moreover, we use the notation ψs for the contract
involving student s selected by ψ, that is, ψs (·) = ψ (·) ∩Xs.
A. Desired properties of choice functions and mechanisms
Below, we define the properties that we consider desirable for both the allo-
cations and choice functions used by programs and for a centralized mechanism
that assigns students to programs. The first one is privilege monotonicity.
Definition 1. A choice function Cp : 2
X → 2X is privilege monotonic if for
any given set of contracts Y ⊂ X, and any student s with no contract in Y ,
(s, p, ts) /∈ Cp(Y ∪ {(s, p, ts)}) =⇒ (s, p, t
′) /∈ Cp(Y ∪ {(s, p, t
′)}), ∀t′ ≤ ts.
Privilege monotonicity suggests that when a student applies to a program,
claiming an additional privilege should not decrease her chance of being accepted.
As a result, when a student applies to a program that uses a choice function with
that property, it is always safe for her to claim all the privileges that she can.
This creates a strategic simplicity for those students when it comes to the decision
of which privileges to claim. When the choice function is not privilege monotonic
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there are circumstances in which, in order to be accepted, the student should
not claim some privilege. This, in general, gives an advantage to students who
strategically manipulate the set of privileges claimed. By removing any gain from
those manipulations, the use of privilege monotonic choice function “levels the
playing field” for those students (Pathak and So¨nmez, 2008), eliminating those
strategic aspects from the outcomes obtained by them.
Moreover, as an additional benefit, the use of privilege monotonic choice func-
tions makes the privileges claimed a more reliable information. That is, similarly
to the fact that strategy-proofness turns the preferences submitted by students
into more reliable information for welfare estimations, here privilege monotonic-
ity does the same for the composition of candidates in terms of their affirmative
action characteristics.
Fairness of the choice function, as we use it here, indicates that if a student
is not chosen, those contracts that are chosen include students who either have
higher test grades or are there due to the fact that those accepted claimed more
affirmative action characteristics.
Definition 2. For any given set of contracts Y , the chosen set Cp (Y ) is fair in
p if for any x ∈ Yp:
x /∈ Cp (Y ) =⇒ ∀y ∈ Cp (Y ) , either θp (yS) > θp (xS) or xT  yT
We say that a choice function Cp : 2
X → 2X is fair if for any given subset
Y ⊂ X, Cp (Y ) is fair in p. An allocation Y is fair if for any given pair of
contracts x, y ∈ Y
yP ≻
∗
xS
xP =⇒ either θyP (yS) > θyP (xS) or xT  yT
We say that a mechanism ψ is fair if the allocations it produces are fair.
That is, an allocation is fair if the reason why a student is not matched to a
program is because every student matched to that program either has a higher
exam grade or is claiming strictly more privileges. Note that since we are con-
cerned about the fairness of a program both in isolation and in conjunction with
other programs, we have two definitions of fairness of allocations, as well as for
choice functions and mechanisms.
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Definition 2 only focuses on pairwise comparisons of chosen and not chosen
students, and in particular, does not place any restrictions on total numbers of
chosen students of various types. For example, a choice function that simply ranks
students based on their grades is fair. Similarly, a choice function that is based
on privilege vectors (e.g., simply ranking students by the number of privileged
categories that they belong to), and only uses exam grades to break ties on the
margin, is also fair.
The Brazilian legislation, and many other affirmative action programs, uses
specific numbers of reserved seats as a method to quantify the proportion of
them which can be used to assist the students who are target of these policies.
As we have described in section II, there are four combinations of privileges that
have seats reserved for those claiming them, and their numbers are derived from
formulas in the Ministry of Education’s guidelines. Our next definition is designed
to satisfy these types of conditions. It codifies the extent to which students with
certain combinations of privileges have their access to universities assisted in the
number of seats reserved for them.
Definition 3. For any given set of contracts Y , the chosen set Cp (Y ) legalis-
tically satisfies the affirmative action objectives at program p if for all
vectors of privileges t, |Cp (Y ) ∩ Yt| ≥ min
{
qt, |Yt|
}
. Moreover, a choice function
Cp : 2
X → 2X legalistically satisfies the affirmative action objectives at program p
if for every Y , Cp (Y ) legalistically satisfies the affirmative action objectives in p.
As said in the name of the property itself, the definition above takes the notion
of “satisfying the affirmative action objectives” very literally and legalistically,
and most importantly, it ignores an inherent relationship between combinations
of privileges. For example, both sets of seats Q
(H,M,I)
p and Q
(H,m,I)
p give priority
to those claiming public HS (H) and low-income (I) privileges, ignoring therefore
the fact that those who are also minority students are eligible to apply to both
of them. As we will show in section IV, indeed, ignoring this relationship is
at the heart of the flaws of the Brazil Reserves procedure. It is important to
note, therefore, that as opposed to the other properties presented in this section,
legalistically satisfying the affirmative action objectives is not among the things
that we necessarily “want”, especially if it comes at the cost of violating fairness.
If we consider the historical context in which most affirmative action policies
are introduced, it seems clear that its goal is to help disadvantaged groups of
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applicants, and not to mandate an exact makeup of various combinations of ad-
vantages and disadvantages. There is, however, a more flexible way to interpret
them, which we describe below.
Definition 4. A choice function Cp : 2
X → 2X satisfies the spirit of the
affirmative action objectives at program p if for every Y ⊆ X and vector
of privileges t:
∑
t′≥t
|Cp (Y ) ∩ Yt′ | ≥
∑
t′≥t
min
{
qt
′
p , |Yt′ |
}
That is, we say that a choice function satisfies the spirit of the affirmative action
objectives if it takes an inclusive interpretation of the number of seats reserved:
seats reserved to students claiming some privileges might also be used to accept
those claiming even more privileges. Definition 4 better embodies the intention
behind the use of affirmative action policies when compared to its “legalistic”
counterpart: reserving seats for those claiming a privilege might help anyone who
is eligible, not only those who do not claim other ones as well. Notice that this
definition constitutes a weakening of definition 3, in that a choice function that
legalistically satisfies the affirmative action objectives also does so in spirit. As
we will see, however, having the objective of satisfying this weaker interpretation
of the affirmative action objectives will not come at the cost of the other desirable
properties, as opposed to the stricter one.
Next, a commonly desired property for an allocation in a matching market is
stability.
Definition 5. An allocation Y is stable under preferences (s)s∈S and choice
functions (Cp)p∈P if
(i) For all s ∈ S and for all p ∈ P , Ys ≻s ∅, Cp (Y ) = Yp; and
(ii) 6 ∃ (p, s) ∈ P×S, and contract x ∈ X\Y , such that x ∈ Cp ((Y \ Ys) ∪ {x}) , x ≻s
Ys.
In college admissions processes like the one in Brazil, the choice function used
by the programs embodies a legal requirement, establishing who among the ap-
plicants has the right to be admitted into a program. Stability, therefore, is a
natural desirable characteristic for an allocation. If each student applies to only
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one program, stability requires that the rules encoded in the choice function de-
termine which students should be selected. While the law currently does not
say anything about the allocation of students to colleges when students apply
to multiple colleges, stability presents a natural way to solve this ambiguity: a
student will only be matched to a less desirable program if, by following the rules
of acceptance there, she would not be accepted given the students who have been
matched to that program. Unstable allocations, therefore, have the potential to
lead to lawsuits from dissatisfied students.
Next, we define incentive-compatibility in our setup, where students have not
only preferences but also privilege vectors.
Definition 6. A mechanism ψ is incentive-compatible if
∄s ∈ S, δ−s ∈
∏
j∈S\{s}
∆j , δ
′ ∈ ∆s, such that ψs
(
δ′, δ−s
)
P
≻∗s ψs ((ts,≻
∗
s) , δ−s)P .
In other words, it would be in the best interest of any student that we consider,
no matter what her true preferences are or which privileges are available to her,
to reveal her true preferences and claim all the privileges that she is eligible for.
IV. Current Mechanism Revisited
When we look at the motivation behind the implementation of most affirmative
action policies, we usually find that it comes from the fact that without them the
individuals targeted by these policies would be underrepresented in the popula-
tion that is accepted by these institutions. In fact, when access was determined
solely by exam grades, low-income and racial minorities were significantly under-
represented among students accepted to Brazilian public universities (McCowan,
2007). This is therefore associated with some negative correlation between perfor-
mance in the exam and a student belonging to one of the targeted populations.
Since this fact and the way that it relates to the problems we identify in the
current mechanism are crucial to our analysis, we will use the notion below.
Definition 7. A set of contracts Y satisfies weakly disadvantaged minorities
if, for any program p and privilege vector t for which |Yp,t| > q
t
p, the student s
with the
(
qtp + 1
)th
highest grade in p among students in s (Yp,t), is such that for
every s′ ∈ s
(
Yp,t′
)
, where t′ < t, θp (s) < θp (s
′).
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A population of students with one contract per student in Y that satisfied
weakly disadvantaged minorities, therefore, have the students who are at the
margin of the quotas for their characteristics having a grade lower, at that pro-
gram, than students claiming fewer privileges. The definition also contains, as a
special case, a stronger (but simpler) condition:
Remark. If, for any pair of contracts x, y in a given set of contracts Y xT <
yT =⇒ θp (xS) > θp (yS), then Y satisfies weakly disadvantaged minorities.
That is, if students claiming more privileges is associated with having lower
grades then the set of contracts satisfies weakly disadvantaged minorities. Our
definition still allows for the existence of multiple minority students with grades
that are higher than those who do not belong to a minority group, however. If
the population of students satisfy that condition, in fact, Brazil Reserves satisfies
most of the desirable characteristics that we listed in section III.A:
Proposition 1. Let CBRp be any implementation of the Brazil Reserves. Then,
CBRp legalistically satisfies affirmative action objectives. Moreover, given a set of
contracts Y that satisfies weakly disadvantaged minorities, CBRp (Y ) is fair in p.
The proposition below shows, however, that when some subset of contracts
associated with a program does not satisfy weakly disadvantaged minorities, an
incompatibility between fairness and legalistically satisfying affirmative action
objectives emerges.
Proposition 2. For any college admission problem with multidimensional privi-
leges where for every p and t |Xp,t| ≥ q
t
p, if there exists a set of contracts Y ⊆ X
violating weakly disadvantaged minorities, then no choice function exists which
legalistically satisfies the affirmative action objectives and is fair.
Proposition 2 shows that, when the policymaker wants to target individuals
with different combinations of privileges in the composition of the accepted cohort,
this generally comes at the cost of rejecting students with high grades and claiming
more privileges.
When the affirmative action policy involves only one type of privilege, such as
minority reserves (Hafalir, Yenmez and Yildirim, 2013), this incompatibility does
not happen because there is a clear hierarchy in the access to seats: majorities
have no quota associated with them. As a result, minority students are only
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rejected when their grades are lower than all accepted minority and non-minority
students.
Next, we show that when contracts do not satisfy weakly disadvantaged minori-
ties, implementations of the Brazil Reserves may fail to satisfy privilege mono-
tonicity, also implying the violation of incentive-compatibility in stable mecha-
nisms in which programs use that choice function.
Example 1. Consider a program p with eight seats and where rp =
1
2 , and
the following set of students, in descending order of grade, and their vectors of
available privileges:
s1 (h,m, i)
s2 (h,m, i)
s3 (h,m, i)
s4 (h,m, i)
s5 (H,M, I)
s6 (H,M, I)
s7 (H,m, I)
s8 (H,M, i)
s9 (H,m, i)
Under the Brazil Reserves choice function, student s6 is rejected. Suppose,
however, that student s6 does not claim minority privileges. Then, the students
applying to each set of seats is the following:
Q(H,M,I) Q(H,m,I) Q(H,M,i) Q(H,m,i) Q(h,m,i)
s5 s6, s7 s8 s9 s1,s2,s3,s4
By claiming fewer privileges student s6 is chosen by any implementation of the
Brazil Reserves, while if she claims all that she is eligible to claim she is not.
Therefore, implementations of Brazil Reserves may not be privilege mono-
tonic. As a result, stable mechanisms using that family of choice functions
will therefore not be incentive-compatible, since a student who prefers to be
matched to a program may be accepted by claiming fewer privileges than she is
eligible for.
16 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
The example above shows that since the Brazil Reserves choice functions give
priority for some seats to students who claim subsets of the privileges that a
student may claim, some students may have an incentive to not claim all of her
privileges. More specifically, if, for example, a minority student from public HS
knows that a large number of high-scoring candidates may be applying to the
seats in Q(H,M,i), she might increase her chances of being accepted by apply-
ing to Q(H,m,i) instead. This could give an unfair advantage to students who,
for example, obtain information about other students’ choices or who exchange
information with their peers about their choices.
The proposition below shows that these incentive problems induced by the
Brazil Reserves choice functions are intrinsically related to violations of the prop-
erty of weakly disadvantaged minorities.
Proposition 3. Let CBRp be any implementation of the Brazil Reserves. Let
also Y be a set of contracts that satisfies weakly disadvantaged minorities and in
which (i) no student has two contracts with different privilege vectors, and (ii)
for every t we have that |Yp,t| ≥ q
t
p. Then, for every student s with a contract
(s, p, t) ∈ Y where (s, p, t) 6∈ CBRp (Y ), for every t
′ < t it is the case that (s, p, t′) 6∈
CBRp (Y \{(s, p, t)} ∪ {(s, p, t
′)}).
That is, as long as there are enough students with each combination of privi-
leges applying to a college, contracts satisfying weakly disadvantaged minorities
guarantees that no student can manipulate the privileges they claim and become
accepted by a college.
The shortcomings of the Brazil Reserves identified in this section rely on con-
figurations in which the set of students’ contracts violate weakly disadvantaged
minorities. In the next section, we use empirical data to see whether these con-
cerns are relevant or just a theoretical possibility.
V. Empirical Evidence
Although in the last section we showed that under the government’s guidelines
outcomes may not be fair and students may not be accepted to a program unless
they strategize over the privileges that they claim, one may wonder how empir-
ically relevant those situations are. After all, when there are more candidates
than seats (which is the case in the vast majority of federal programs in Brazil,)
in order for a student to successfully manipulate her claims she must have an
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exam grade that is higher than that of a student who is accepted but did not
claim some privileges. For example, a low-income minority student who is not
accepted when claiming all of her eligible privileges (and therefore has an exam
grade that is lower than all those who are claiming those privileges) can only suc-
cessfully manipulate her claims if her exam grade is higher than some student who
has been accepted despite claiming fewer privileges. Since the affirmative action
program is implemented to increase the access of those students when compared
to a system that selects based simply on exam grades, it seems reasonable to ex-
pect these opportunities of manipulation to be rare. Note, moreover, that these
allocations, which would allow for a successful manipulation of privileges claimed,
are not fair: a student who is able to profitably manipulate is not accepted to
a program and has a higher exam grade than a student who is accepted and is
claiming fewer privileges.
We obtained the cutoff exam grades (that is, the lowest exam grade among those
accepted in the program) for each of the five sets of seats described in section II
for all the 3,187 federal higher education programs that participated in the SiSU
in 2013 and implemented the guidelines described in section II.10 Following the
timeline specified in the law, during this first year of implementation of the new
policies, the universities could opt to allocate only a quarter of the seats that
would ultimately be allocated for the affirmative action policy. That is, instead
of 50% of the seats in each program, the universities could opt to offer 12.5% or
more. The ratios of those seats reserved for students claiming low income and
minority privileges, however, remain at 0.5 and rp, respectively.
11
Let θ∗p (H,m, i) be the cutoff grade at program p for the set of seats desig-
nated for students who claim the vector of privileges (H,m, i). For example,
θ∗p (H,m, I) is the cutoff grade at program p for the seats designated for stu-
dents who claim public HS and low-income privileges. A necessary condition
for a student to be able to successfully manipulate her claimed privileges is that
the cutoff grade for seats designated with a certain set of privileges is higher
than the cutoff grade for seats designated with a subset of those privileges. This
10Although the SiSU centrally matches students to programs, using a deferred acceptance procedure
in which students’ reported preferences are restricted to only two acceptable programs, for the sake of the
analysis presented in this section those details are unimportant, since the conditions for the manipulation
of the privileges claimed that we argue here, assuming a decentralized system, immediately translate to
manipulations in the SiSU.
11As mentioned in section II, the value of rp is the proportion of minorities in the overall population
in the state where program p is located.
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means that there may be a student who was not accepted but has an exam
grade that is high enough to be accepted when applying to a set of seats desig-
nated for a lower number of privileges. For example, suppose there is a program
p ∈ P such that θ∗p (H,m, I) > θ
∗
p (H,m, i). Let there be a student s with a
vector of available privileges ts = (H,m, I) and an exam grade θp (s) such that
θ∗p (H,m, I) > θp (s) > θ
∗
p (H,m, i). If she claims all of her available privileges she
will not be accepted, since θ∗p (H,m, I) > θp (s). However, if she does not claim
a low-income privilege she will be accepted, since θp (s) > θ
∗
p (H,m, i). Notice
that when this is the case, the set of contracts associated with the set of students
applying to that program violates weakly disadvantaged minorities.
Since we do not have data on the grades of the students who were not accepted,
however, we are not able to determine whether there are, in fact, students who
could have been accepted if they had manipulated the privileges they were claim-
ing. However, given the high competition for seats in those programs — in total
there were 1,757,399 candidates and 129,319 seats, an average of 13.59 candidates
per seat12 — it is reasonable to use the occurrence of those disparities in cutoff
grades as an indication of the existence of opportunities for manipulation. We
therefore looked for instances in which the cutoff grades for a set of seats reserved
for students claiming a certain set of privileges were higher than the cutoff grades
for seats, in the same program, reserved for students who were claiming a subset
of those privileges. The results are presented in Table 1.
Regarding the values in Table 1, the first fact to note is how pervasive the issue
is. In more than 54% of the programs there is at least one instance in which
those conditions for manipulability are observed. That is, there is a reasonable
chance that in those programs, the allocation is not fair: students that are the
target of the affirmative action policies are not being accepted even though they
have higher exam grades than those who are accepted. One might wonder how
significant the differences are between the cutoff grades presented above, since
when these are too small it becomes less likely that some student would have
the opportunity to successfully manipulate her outcome. The grades obtained in
the exam, across all students who took it, range from 261.33 to 971.5. Since the
competition for seats is very high, however, the more relevant information is how
those differences compare to the range of grades that allow for acceptance in some
12Source: http://g1.globo.com/educacao/noticia/2013/01/sisu-registra-quase-2-milhoes-de-
inscricoes-diz-ministerio-da-educacao.html (Accessed on October 16, 2017).
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Number of occurrences Average difference
(out of 3,187) (standard deviation)
θ∗p (H,M, I) > θ
∗
p (H,M, i) 935
11.56
(13.24)
θ∗p (H,M, I) > θ
∗
p (H,m, I) 398
12.60
(14.70)
θ∗p (H,M, I) > θ
∗
p (H,m, i) 161
13.67
(15.19)
θ∗p (H,M, I) > θ
∗
p (h,m, i) 51
8.88
(8.53)
θ∗p (H,M, i) > θ
∗
p (H,m, i) 217
14.85
(17.29)
θ∗p (H,M, i) > θ
∗
p (h,m, i) 79
13.20
(12.25)
θ∗p (H,m, I) > θ
∗
p (H,m, i) 452
15.19
(16.29)
θ∗p (H,m, I) > θ
∗
p (h,m, i) 181
12.15
(13.25)
θ∗p (H,m, i) > θ
∗
p (h,m, i) 384
13.06
13.79
Number of programs
with at least one of the 1,730 (out of 3,187)
cases above
Table 1—Instances in which the observable conditions for the manipulability of the cur-
rent guidelines are met and the average difference in the cutoff grades. Source: Brazilian
Ministry of Education.
programs. By observing the distribution of cutoff grades across all programs we
therefore have a better idea of the range of exam grades obtained by those who
are closer to the borderline between being accepted or not. Table 2 shows the
difference between the 5% quantile and the 95% quantile, for each, 90% of them
are in the 500–750 range and 61.14% are in the 600–700 range. Moreover, 64.67%
of the differences summarized in Table 1 are greater than or equal to 5 points.
Although we could not find any data on the number of candidates and seats
for each of the programs above, we did discover some information for one of the
universities, UNIFESP, which published the number of candidates per seat for its
56 programs, 38 of them among those with the issue above. Table 3 shows the
values of the cutoff grades and the number of candidates per seat for each type
of seat for four programs in that university. These give an indication of the likely
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Seats Q(H,M,I) Q(H,M,i) Q(H,m,I) Q(H,m,i) Q(h,m,i)
Average 628.18 634.59 639.28 652.02 665.76
5% Quantile 563.02 564.67 572.46 578.45 593.82
95% Quantile 703.14 718.92 722.29 738.06 752.36
Difference 140.12 154.25 149.84 159.61 158.54
Table 2—Quantiles of cut-off grades
reason why the numbers in Table 1 are so dramatic: the competition for seats
reserved under the affirmative action policy is very high, and therefore there
are enough students who claim those privileges and have high exam grades to
push up the value level of the cutoff grades. Since the number of seats allocated
for affirmative action will increase to its target 50% in the coming years, the
proportion of programs with this issue will likely be reduced. But given how
extreme the differences are in the competitiveness of the seats, it is reasonable to
expect it to remain significant.
Seats Q(H,M,I) Q(H,m,I) Q(H,M,i) Q(H,m,i) Q(h,m,i)
Cutoff C/S Cutoff C/S Cutoff C/S Cutoff C/S Cutoff C/S
Philosophy 652.76 28.50 671.53 18.00 657.70 25.50 688.18 30.50 675.93 10.69
History 684.29 71.00 667.92 36.67 669.67 42.50 678.29 50.00 685.78 19.00
Economics 682.82 83.50 732.68 111.00 696.24 60.00 719.46 117.00 719.26 41.65
Pharmacy 681.58 88.67 679.82 81.40 673.94 70.67 703.66 105.00 704.88 30.01
Table 3—Cutoff grades and candidates per seat (C/S) for programs at UNIFESP in 2013.
Source: UNIFESP
VI. Student-proposing stable mechanism
As we have shown in section IV, the Brazil Reserves choice function suffers
from serious shortcomings when the contracts available to students violate weakly
disadvantaged minorities. High-achieving low-income and/or minority students
may not be accepted into a program while students without those characteristics
are. Moreover, students who strategically manipulate the privileges they claim
may obtain an unfair advantage. The empirical evidence in the last section shows
evidence compatible with a pervasiveness of these problems.
In this section we take a closer look at the flaws in the design of the Brazil
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Reserves which lead to these problems, and develop a solution that solves those
issues for the Brazilian college admissions and for a wide range of similar problems.
For that, we propose a choice function, that could be used by the universities even
in the absence of a centralized mechanism to produce assignments. That is, if
a university simply faces a pool of applicants, the choice function could be used
to determine which ones should be accepted by that university. We also aim to
design a mechanism that carries out our choice function’s properties and produces
stable allocations.
We are proposing a new choice function, which consists of a choice procedure
with slot-specific priorities, where the priorities are designed in such a way that
any possible gain from strategizing over the privileges claimed is removed.
The intuition behind the way in which the slot-specific priorities are designed
is that whenever a set of contracts Yt are in a slot’s priority ordering, contracts
Yt′ claiming more privileges (that is, t
′ > t) must either have a higher priority
than those in Yt or must be ordered by grade together with Yt. For example,
suppose a program p has a single seat and can accept contracts claiming the
vectors of privileges (H,M, I), (H,m, I) and (H,m, i), with priorities between
these contracts as follows:
Y(h,m,i) ◮ Y (H,m,I) ◮ Y (H,M,I)
Priorities among contracts within the same indifference class are determined by
the students’ exam grades. Under those priorities, a student claiming the vector
of privileges (H,M, I) would only be accepted if there were no students claiming
(h,m, i) or (H,m, I), regardless of their exam grades. If that student instead
claims (h,m, i) and her exam grade is high enough then she could be accepted to
that seat. That is, a manipulation of her privilege vector would be profitable. In
the priority orders used in the Brazil Reserves, we see this problem: in the seats
in Q(H,m,i), for example, contracts claiming (H,M, i) have lower priority than any
contract claiming (H,m, i).
Consider instead the following two alternative priorities:13
13In the second alternative we give, the priority between the contracts in the first indifference class is
lexicographic, first based on students’ exam grades, and then based on any arbitrary order of privileges
claimed. In practice, as we will show later, this order of privileges within the indifference classes is
inconsequential, since students will only use contracts with a single vector of privileges. As a result, the
priority order between contracts involving two different students within an indifference class is determined
only by their grades.
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Y(H,M,I) ◮
′ Y (H,m,I) ◮
′ Y (h,m,i)
Y(H,M,I) ∪ Y (H,m,I) ◮
′′ Y (h,m,i)
In both cases, no manipulation of the vector of privileges claimed can be prof-
itable: a student who is not chosen while claiming a vector of privileges would
also not be chosen by claiming fewer privileges. Notice, however, that under ◮′
whenever there is at least one student claiming the vector (H,M, I) the chosen
student will be the one claiming that vector, whereas under ◮′′ a student claiming
the vector (H,M, I) will only be chosen if her exam grade are greater than all
the students claiming (H,M, I) or (H,m, I) in Y .
That is, under ◮′′ students who claim (H,m, I) are still eligible for preferential
treatment in the presence of students claiming (H,M, I). In order to eliminate
gains that the latter could have by misrepresenting their privileges, however, this
preferential treatment is conditional on having grades that are higher than some
students claiming (H,M, I).
Next, we generalize this insight and apply the solution to the Brazilian case.
A. The multidimensional privileges choice function
We will now extend the notation we have been using for an arbitrary set of
privileges, while keeping it consistent with what we have done so far. There is a
list of privileges Γ =
(
γ1, γ2, . . . , γk
)
that students can claim, and each student
s can claim some subset of those privileges. We denote the vector of available
privileges of student s by ts =
(
t1s, t
2
s, . . . , t
k
s
)
, where tis ∈ {0, 1}. Student s can
claim privilege γi if and only if tis = 1.
The set of combinations of privileges that can be claimed therefore consist of
a list of vectors T =
(
t1, t2, . . . , t2
k−1
)
, ordered by the number in the binary
base that they represent. For example, let k = 3. Then t0 refers to claiming no
privilege — (0, 0, 0) — t1 for claiming only the privilege γ1, that is, the vector
(0, 0, 1), t6 for claiming both γ2 and γ3, that is, the vector (1, 1, 0), and so on. Each
program p has a list of affirmative action objectives, which are non-negative values
associated with each vector of privileges in T :
(
qt
0
p , q
t1
p , . . . , q
t2
k
−1
p
)
. The total
number of reserved seats equals the capacity of a program:
∑2k−1
i=0 q
ti
p = qp. Seats
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that are not reserved for any privilege vector are “reserved” for those claiming t0.
In line with our observations, in each seat that is reserved for some privilege
vector t, we will combine, together, contracts claiming a superset of those priv-
ileges. Therefore, for every set of contracts Y , vector of privileges t, and seat
reserved for it Qtp, the slot-specific priority is:
Qtp :


⋃
t′∈{0,1}k:t′≥t
Yt′

 ◮ Yt2k−1 ◮ Yt2k−2 ◮ · · · ◮ Yt0
No contract is ordered more than once, so if a contract is in the first class,
it is not repeated down the ordering.14 Contracts within a class are ordered
lexicographically, as follows:
(
s, p, t′
)
◮
(
s′, p, t′′
)
=⇒ θp (s) > θp
(
s′
)
or s = s′ and t′ > t′′
We denote any choice function that is based on the slot-specific priorities above
by a multidimensional privileges choice function, or CMCFp . In these choice
functions, in any seat reserved for contracts claiming a vector of privileges t,
the top class combines those contracts with t with those contracts claiming all
the privileges in t and some extra privileges. Since students may choose not
to claim some privilege that is available to them, what this does is combine
contracts from students claiming t with contracts from students who could choose
to claim t. The way that the contracts within indifference classes are ordered
makes sure that high-achieving students claiming more privileges can compete
for seats reserved for those claiming fewer privileges, ensuring fairness, and that
the contract claiming the largest set of privileges is the one chosen among those
available to a student. The rest of the priority order, in decreasing order of
privileges claimed, removes the possibility of a strategic manipulation of privileges
when there are not enough contracts in the first indifference class.
In addition to these characteristics related to fairness and privilege monotonic-
ity, the way the top indifference classes combine contracts makes sure that when-
ever there are enough high-scoring students claiming each combination of priv-
ileges, they will be matched to the seats reserved for them. All of these facts
combine into the theorem below.
14We do not make that explicit in the notation for simplicity of exposition.
24 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
Theorem 1. Every choice function CMCFp is privilege monotonic, fair, and sat-
isfies the spirit of the affirmative action objectives. If Y ⊆ X satisfies weakly
disadvantaged minorities then CMCFp (Y ) legalistically satisfies the affirmative ac-
tion objectives for any program p.
The properties of fairness and satisfaction of the spirit of affirmative action
objectives can also be modeled as a matching with distributional constraints (Ka-
mada and Kojima, 2017) (KK). In the KK model, the matchings of students to
programs are deemed feasible if they satisfy some capacity constraints, which can
include not only capacities for a single program, but also for groups of programs.
Our notions of fairness and affirmative action objectives are closely related to
their model in the cases where, whenever a program p chooses from a set of con-
tracts Y , it contains at least qtp contracts with type t, for each t such that q
t
p > 0.
In this case, for each matching of students that is fair and satisfies the spirit of
affirmative action objectives, we are able to construct an instance of the KK
model, in which a corresponding matching is strongly stable with respect to their
model. Notice, however, that when the number of students claiming each vector
of privileges is not large enough, this relation does not involve affirmative action
objectives.
We can now apply the definition of the multidimensional privileges choice func-
tion to the Brazilian affirmative action policies. Given a set of contracts Y , the
slot-specific priorities for the seats in a program are as follows:
Set Number of seats Slots priorities
Q(H,M,I)
⌈ qp
4 rp
⌉
Y(H,M,I) ◮ Y (H,m,I) ◮ Y (H,M,i) ◮ Y (H,m,i) ◮ Y (h,m,i)
Q(H,M,i)
⌈ qp
4 rp
⌉
Y(H,M,I) ∪ Y (H,M,i) ◮ Y (H,m,I) ◮ Y (H,m,i) ◮ Y (h,m,i)
Q(H,m,I)
⌈ qp
4 (1− rp)
⌉
Y(H,M,I) ∪ Y (H,m,I) ◮ Y (H,M,i) ◮ Y (H,m,i) ◮ Y (h,m,i)
Q(H,m,i)
⌈ qp
4 (1− rp)
⌉
Y(H,M,I) ∪ Y (H,m,I) ∪ Y (H,M,i) ∪ Y (H,m,i) ◮ Y (h,m,i)
Q(h,m,i) Q− 2
(
q(H,M,I) + q(H,m,i)
)
Y(H,M,I) ∪ Y (H,m,I) ∪ Y (H,M,i) ∪ Y (H,m,i) ∪ Y (h,m,i)
The precedence order in which those slots are filled is left as a choice for the
policymaker. Although the order that is chosen does not impact any of the results
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presented in this paper, different orders of precedence may lead to accepting
different sets of students (Kominers and So¨nmez, 2016; Dur et al., 2018).15 We
will denote this implementation of the multidimensional privileges choice function
for the Brazilian case by CBR−MCF.
As shown in Theorem 1, when using CBR−MCF allocations will be fair in any
program and incentives for strategically manipulating the privileges claimed are
eliminated. This represents a clear improvement over the problems identified in
the Brazil Reserves. The objective of legalistically satisfying affirmative action
objectives, however, goes in the opposite direction. While the Brazil Reserves
always produces allocations that satisfy them, CBR−MCF may not. This is not a
surprise: we saw in proposition 2 that fairness is, in general, incompatible with
legalistically satisfying affirmative action objectives.
The choice between Brazil Reserves and CBR−MCF, therefore, may be seen as
a choice between (i) legalistically satisfying affirmative action objectives or (ii)
fairness and privilege monotonicity. While this points to a seemingly straightfor-
ward trade-off, the lack of privilege monotonicity in Brazil Reserves may lead to
manipulations on the part of students that lead to the set of accepted students
legalistically violating affirmative action objectives, as shown in example 1.
B. The student-proposing stable mechanism
We now present a mechanism that, given students’ preferences over programs
and their vectors of claimed privileges, produces an allocation of students to pro-
grams. For each student s we collect her preference ranking over programs ≻∗s and
the vector of privileges claimed ts. We then use the cumulative offer mechanism
(Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005), which is a generalization of the Gale-Shapley de-
ferred acceptance mechanism for the problem of matching with contracts. While
the preference relation over contracts s contains indifferences, we make a small
modification to the mechanism by making students propose only contracts with
the vector of privileges they submitted. As shown in Kominers and So¨nmez
15To illustrate why this is the case, consider a simple example of a program with two sets of seats,
Q1 and Q2, both with unit capacity, where Q1 orders contracts claiming a privilege γ above those not
claiming any privilege. Let the students, in descending order of grades, be S = {s1, s2, s3}, where only
s1 and s3 claim the privilege γ. If the precedence order is Q1 ⊲ Q2 student s1 will be allocated to seat
Q1 and s2 to Q2, so the set of students accepted is {s1, s2}. If the precedence order is Q2 ⊲ Q1, instead,
then s1 will be allocated to seat Q2, and s3 will be allocated to seat Q1, since that seat will prioritize s3
over s2, due to the fact that the former is claiming γ. As a result, the set of students accepted becomes
{s1, s3}.
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(2016), when the programs’ choice functions are based on slot-specific priorities,
such as CMCF, the outcome of that mechanism is stable. While in principle,
due to the elimination of indifferences, the outcome would not necessarily also
be stable with respect to s, we show below that this is also the case here. The
overall procedure, therefore, is denoted the student-proposing stable mechanism,
or SPSM. A detailed description of the mechanism is given in the Appendix.
Although we have shown that the choice function that we proposed satisfies
the desired fairness and incentives properties, we are also interested in knowing
whether the corresponding properties are satisfied by the overall allocation when
the SPSM mechanism is used to match students to programs. The first properties
that we analyze are stability and fairness.
Proposition 4. The student-proposing stable mechanism, ψSPSM, is stable under
(s)s∈S and C
MCF, and is fair.
The next property that we present here is the incentive-compatibility of the
mechanism, which is a desired characteristic in mechanism design. Incentive-
compatibility in this context can be described as a property that guarantees that
students cannot be better off by strategizing over the preferences being submitted
or privileges being claimed. In our problem, the students’ strategy spaces consist
not only of the preferences over schools but also the privileges claimed. Although
it may be tempting to conclude that the incentive-compatibility of the SPSM
immediately follows as a corollary of the well-known incentive properties of the
SPSM mechanism, due to the wider strategy space for students the result must
be obtained explicitly.
Proposition 5. The student-proposing stable mechanism, ψSPSM, is incentive-
compatible.
C. Beyond the Brazilian case
We showed that multidimensional privileges choice function and the student-
proposing stable mechanism in association with these functions, constitute pro-
posals with desirable characteristics for the Brazilian affirmative action policies.
The problems that we identified, and the solution, however, potentially have a
much wider applicability. The main characteristics that a matching or assignment
problem should have to create the incentives to misrepresent their privileges, but
be solved with our proposal, are listed below.
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Preferential treatment based on multiple characteristics. — One crucial
aspect of the affirmative action policies in Brazil that we describe is that they
target multiple characteristics that individuals may have: income, ethnicity, and
the type of institution they studied. Most importantly, they may have different
combinations of these characteristics. When that is not the case, existing minority
reserves mechanisms, such as minority reserves (Hafalir, Yenmez and Yildirim,
2013) and the “soft bounds” mechanism in Ehlers et al. (2014) provide most of
the benefits we have shown.
Optionality of not claiming privileges. — In the Brazilian affirmative action
policy, the opportunity to claim any privilege is entirely optional. A student
who belongs to a low-income family, for example, may choose not to claim that
fact when applying to universities. The same for black students or those from
public HS. In order for our solution to remove the incentives for manipulation,
however, that optionality must go only in one direction. A low-income student
may choose not to claim that privilege, but a high-income one cannot choose
to do so. Clearly, when that is not the case and agents are able to costlessly
claim privileges or not, whenever that characteristic is used in a beneficial or
detrimental way, strategical considerations will be unavoidable. Whenever there
is the need for some documental proof associated with the privilege, such as, for
example, a medical documentation certifying a disability, however, this directed
optionality is satisfied.
Indifference among different types of seats. — We have assumed, through-
out the paper, that students have preferences only over the programs to which
they are matched. That is, that they are indifferent to which specific seat was
used in their acceptance. When that is not the case then our solution would
have different strategic implications and would not be incentive-compatible. In
the Indian engineering schools, whether a student is admitted to a reserved seat
determines whether college housing is provided, for example. In that case, a so-
lution that considers that preference may restore incentive-compatibility (Aygu¨n
and Turhan, 2020).
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VII. Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed, under the perspective of a market designer, the
affirmative action policy implemented in the selection of students for federal uni-
versities in Brazil. We showed that the method chosen by the policymakers, in
which students claiming the same set of privileges compete on the basis of exam
grades, may lead to unfair matchings and create incentives for students to strate-
gize over the privileges that they claim.
The empirical evidence that we provided indicates that these problems are likely
not just a purely theoretical possibility but may be affecting the outcomes of a
large number of students. The solution that we provide is based on a simple
principle: when students are applying for seats reserved for those claiming some
privileges, those claiming more privileges must be able to compete for them as
well. Otherwise, by claiming fewer privileges students may have access to seats
that would otherwise be out of their reach.
In a broader sense, some of the lessons that we learned from the policy ana-
lyzed also apply to other market design problems. The initial motivation that
led to the implementation of the affirmative action policies was the observation
that, under the old criterion for acceptance based solely on exam grades, the af-
fected populations were underrepresented. This was, in large part, due to the fact
that students from public HS, minorities, and from low-income families obtained,
on average, lower exam grades. Giving those students a higher priority in sets of
seats proportional to its population seems at first sight to be a solution that would
work well. One problem is that not all of these students have low grades and,
moreover, they may have different preferences. If low-income students are more
likely to prefer a particular program than those with a high income, for example,
the competition for the low-income seats would be substantially higher than that
for the high-income, therefore leading to fairness and incentive problems. Policy-
makers must, whenever possible, design mechanisms that are robust to different
configurations and assumptions about the characteristics of the participants.
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Appendix
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Let a program’s choice function CBRp be an implemen-
tation of the Brazil Reserves. Then, for any privilege vector t > (0, 0, 0) that
students can submit, CBRp requires q
t seats to give contracts with the privilege
vector t highest priority. Now, consider any given set of contracts Y and any
given privilege vector t > (0, 0, 0). During the choice procedure, some contracts
with privilege vector t may be chosen before CBRp handles the group of seats Q
t
p.
Therefore, when the choice function handles the group of seats Qtp, the number of
remaining contracts with the privilege vector t will be either less than or equal to
qt, or greater than qt. In the former case, the choice function chooses all remain-
ing contracts, in the latter case, qt contracts with the privilege vector t. So, from
any given contract set Y , the choice function CBRp chooses either all contracts
with the privilege vector t, or qt contracts with the privilege vector t. Hence,
CBRp legalistically satisfies the affirmative action objectives.
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As the second part of the proof, one should note that given that CBRp legalisti-
cally satisfies the affirmative action objectives, for any privilege vector t > (0, 0, 0)
if a contract x ∈ Y with privilege vector t is rejected, then xS is not among the
top qt students who claimed the privilege vector t. Thus, xS has a lower grade
than the owners of any contract with privilege vector t′ < t, by weakly disadvan-
taged minorities. By definition, fairness is violated only if there exists a chosen
contract whose owner has a lower grade with a privilege vector t′ < t. Since their
owners have higher grades, CBRp is fair.
Proof of Proposition 2: By assumption, for every p and t |Xp,t| ≥ q
t
p. Assume
there exists a set of contracts Y ⊆ X violating weakly disadvantaged minorities.
So, there exists a program p and a pair of contracts x, x′ such that p(x) = p(x′) =
p, t(x) > t(x′), s(x) has the (q
t(x)
p + 1)th highest grade in p among students in
s
(
Yp,t(x)
)
and θp(s(x)) > θp(s(x
′)).
Now consider a set of contracts Y ′ which includes the contracts of the top
(q
t(x)
p +1) students in s(Yp,t(x)) with the privilege vector t(x), q
t(x′)
p contracts with
privilege type t(x′) including x′ and qtp contracts with the privilege vector t, for
all t /∈ {t(x), t(x′)}.
Let C be an arbitrary choice function legalistically satisfying affirmative action
objectives. It is easy to see that C chooses Y ′ \ {x} from the set Y ′, i.e., C(Y ′) =
Y ′ \{x}. Since contract x is rejected, contract x′ is accepted, θp(s(x)) > θp(s(x
′))
and t(x) > t(x′) we say C is not fair. Hence, there is no choice function which
legalistically satisfies affirmative action objectives and is fair.
Proof of Proposition 3: Let a program’s choice function CBRp be an implemen-
tation of the Brazil Reserves. Then, by proposition 1, CBRp legalistically satisfies
affirmative action objectives, which requires that for any privilege vector t, if a
contract x is rejected, then θp(xS) is not among the top q
t
p grades of students who
claimed the privilege vector t. Moreover, for any t′ < t, after replacing x with
(xS , p, t
′), θp(xS) will not be among the top q
t′
p grades of students who claimed
the privilege vector t′, by weakly disadvantaged minorities. Therefore, (xS , p, t
′)
will be rejected due to the property of legalistically satisfying affirmative action
objectives.
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Proof of Theorem 1: First, consider privilege monotonicity. Suppose, for the
sake of contradiction, that there is a set of contracts Y ⊂ X, and a student s
with no contract in Y , where (s, p, ts) /∈ C
MCF
p (Y ∪ {(s, p, ts)}) and (s, p, t
′) ∈
CMCFp (Y ∪ {(s, p, t
′)}), for some t′ ≤ ts. Since the only difference between the
two sets are the contracts (s, p, ts) and (s, p, t
′), the contract (s, p, t′) has a higher
priority than (s, p, ts) at some slot. However, since by construction of C
MCF
p there
is no slot giving higher priority to (s, p, t′) than (s, p, ts), we have a contradiction.
Hence, CMCFp is privilege monotonic.
Second, we prove the fairness property. For any set of contracts Y , if a contract
x = (s, p, t) is rejected, x /∈ CMCFp (Y ) then it is not chosen by any slot of program
p. Since by construction of CMCFp (Y ), there is no slot giving higher priority to a
contract with privilege vector t′ < t, chosen contracts have either higher privilege
vector or have owners with higher grades than s. Therefore, CMCFp (Y ) is fair.
Third, consider satisfying the spirit of the affirmative action objectives property.
Let {Qt
2k−α
p }
2k−1
α=1 be the sequence of groups of seats processed by C
MCF
p . We use
mathematical induction to prove the statement.
Base Case: For α = 1, since agents claiming all privileges have highest priority,
we have |Cp (Y ) ∩ Yt2k−1 | ≥ min
{
qt
2k−1
p ,
∣∣Y
t2
k
−1
∣∣}.
Inductive Step: We now show that for any α our condition is satisfied if it is
satisfied for any α′ < α.
Let Cα
′
p (Y ) be the cumulative set of contracts chosen from the set Y up to step
α′. If the condition is satisfied by any α′ < α, then at the beginning of step α
either we have
∑
t′≥t2k−α
∣∣Cα−1p (Y ) ∩ Yt′
∣∣ ≥
∑
t′≥t2
k
−α
min
{
qt
′
p , |Yt′ |
}
, or
∑
t′≥t2k−α
min
{
qt
′
p , |Yt′ |
}
>
∑
t′≥t2k−α
∣∣Cα−1p (Y ) ∩ Yt′
∣∣ ≥
∑
t′>t2
k
−α
min
{
qt
′
p , |Yt′ |
}
In the former case, condition is satisfied by α. In the latter case, since contracts
with privilege vectors t′ ≥ t2
k−α have highest priority, in step α, either qt
2k−α
p
more contracts are accepted with privilege vectors t′ ≥ t2
k−α, or all remaining
contracts with privilege vectors t′ ≥ t2
k−α are accepted. In any case, we have∑
t′≥t2
k
−α
∣∣Cαp (Y ) ∩ Yt′
∣∣ ≥ ∑
t′≥t2
k
−α min
{
qt
′
p , |Yt′ |
}
. Therefore, for any α our
condition is satisfied. Hence, every choice function CMCFp satisfies the spirit of
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the affirmative action objectives.
Finally, assume that a set of contracts Y satisfies weakly disadvantaged minori-
ties. Let {Qt
2k−α
p }
2k−1
α=1 be the sequence of groups of seats processed by C
MCF
p .
First, consider the privilege vector t2
k−1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1). Since qt
2k−1
seats are
reserved for t2
k−1, it is guaranteed that CMCFp (Y ) has at least min{q
t2
k
−1
, |Y
t2
k
−1}
contracts with privilege vector t2
k−1. Next, as an induction strategy, we will
show that for any α, the number of accepted contracts after the group of seats
Qt
2k−α
p processed by C
MCF
p is no less than min{q
t2
k
−α
, |Y
t2
k
−α}. We already show
induction assumption for α = 1. Now, we will show that the assumption is true
for a given α if it is satisfied for all α′ < α.
Since for all α′ < α the assumption is satisfied, in the first class of contracts
for the group of seats Qt
2k−α
p either there is no contract with a privilege vec-
tor higher than t2
k−α or, due to weakly disadvantaged minorities, the owners of
any remaining contract with a higher privilege vector have lower grades than the
owners of the contracts with t2
k−α. Therefore, when the group of seats Qt
2k−α
p is
processed, the number of chosen contracts with the privilege vector t2
k−α will be
no less than min{qt
2k−α
, |Y
t2
k
−α}. Hence, for any set of contracts Y that satis-
fies weakly disadvantaged minorities, CMCFp legalistically satisfies the affirmative
action objectives.
Proof of Proposition 4: Assume that the student-proposing stable mechanism,
ψSPSM, is not stable under (s)s∈S and C
MCF. Therefore, either the individual
rationality condition is violated or there exists a blocking pair. By construction of
the cumulative offer algorithm, in each step students offer one of their acceptable
contracts. Therefore, no student has a contract worse than being unmatched. If
there is a blocking pair then there exists a pair (p, s) and a contract x′ such that
x′ ≻s ψ
SPSM(s) and x′ ∈ CMCFp (Yp ∪ {x
′}). Let ψSPSM(s) be x. Since x′ ≻s x
there exists another contract x′′ of student s which is offered before x and has the
same privilege vector. Therefore, by IRC, x′′ /∈ CMCFp (Yp∪{x
′′}) and by privilege
monotonicity, x′ /∈ CMCFp (Yp ∪ {x
′}). Hence, ψSPSM is stable under (s)s∈S and
CMCF.
Next, assume that the mechanism is not fair. That is, we can find x, y ∈ X ′
such that yP ≻
∗
xS
xP , θyP (yS) < θyP (xS) and xT > yT . Since we have yP ≻
∗
xS
xP ,
there exists a contract x′ such that x′ = (xS , yP , xT ) and x
′ ≻xS x. By the design
of the cumulative offer mechanism, x′ must be offered by xS and be rejected
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before the final step K. Therefore, at step K, we have y, x′ ∈ AyP (K) and
X ′yP = C
MCF
yP
(AyP (K)). Since, by theorem 1, C
MCF
yp
is fair, x′ is rejected from
AyP (K) and y is accepted, then either θyP (yS) > θyP (xS) or xT  yT must be
true. A contradiction. Hence, ψSPSM, is fair.
Proof of Proposition 5: For an arbitrary student s, assume that δ′ = (t′,≻′s
) 6= (ts,≻s). Let her assigned program from ψ
SPSM(δ′, δ−s) be p
∗. Since for any
fixed submitted privilege vector profile choice functions and SPSM is an example
of a cumulative offer mechanism induced by slot-specific priorities. According to
Theorem 3 of Kominers and So¨nmez (2016), the SPSM cannot be manipulated
via preferences over programs. Therefore, for a strategy δ′′ in which we have
privilege vector t′ and preference where only contract (s, p∗, t′) is acceptable, we
must have ψSPSM(δ′′, δ−s) = p
∗.
Since, by construction of CMCF, no slot of any program gives less priority if
student s applies with ts instead of any t
′ < ts. So, under Theorem 4 of Kominers
and So¨nmez (2016), we have that for a strategy δ′′′ in which we have privilege
vector ts and preference where only contract (s, p
∗, ts) is acceptable, we must have
ψSPSM(δ′′′, δ−s) = p
∗.
Finally, again under Theorem 3 of Kominers and So¨nmez (2016) SPSM cannot
be manipulated via preferences over programs. Therefore, for a strategy δs =
(ts,≻s), we must have ψ
SPSM(δs, δ−s) s p
∗.
Therefore, we have ψSPSM(δs, δ−s) s ψ
SPSM(δ′, δ−s). Hence, ψ
SPSM, is incentive-
compatible.
The cumulative offer mechanism
Below, we provide a brief description of the cumulative offer process, which is
used to produce the student-proposing stable matching. As mentioned in section
VI, we make a small modification to the description of the original procedure,
described in Hatfield and Milgrom (2005).
Step 1: One randomly selected student s1 offers her most preferred contract x
1,
according to her preferences ≻s1 , that contains the privilege vector she submitted.
The program that receives the offer, p1 = x
1
P , holds the contract. Let Ap1(1) = x
1,
and Ap(1) = ∅ for all p 6= p1.
In general,
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Step k ≥ 2: One of the students for whom no contract is currently held by a
program, say sk, offers the most preferred contract, according to her preferences
≻sk , that has not been rejected in previous steps and contains the privilege vector
she submitted. Let us call the new offered contract, xk. Let pk = x
k
P hold
Cpk(Apk(k − 1) ∪ {x
k}) and reject all other contracts in Apk(k − 1) ∪ {x
k} . Let
Apk(k) = Apk(k − 1) ∪ {x
k}, and Ap(k) = Ap(k − 1) for all p 6= pk.
The mechanism terminates when either every student is matched to a program
or every unmatched student has no contract left to offer. The mechanism termi-
nates in a finite numberK of steps due to there being a finite number of contracts.
At that point, the mechanism produces an allocation X ′ =
⋃
p∈P
Cp(Ap(K)), i.e.,
the set of contracts that are held by some program at the terminal step K.
Priority ordering for vacant seats under Brazil Reserves
Below, we list the full priority order used for each set of seats in the Brazil Re-
serves choice functions, for any set of contracts Y ⊆ X. These are used when there
are vacant seats after considering all the candidates applying with the relevant
privileges for that set.
Q(H,M,I) : Y(H,M,I) ◮ Y(H,m,I) ◮ Y(H,M,i) ◮ Y(H,m,i) ◮ Y(h,m,i)
Q(H,m,I) : Y(H,m,I) ◮ Y(H,M,I) ◮ Y(H,M,i) ◮ Y(H,m,i) ◮ Y(h,m,i)
Q(H,M,i) : Y(H,M,i) ◮ Y(H,m,i) ◮ Y(H,M,I) ◮ Y(H,m,I) ◮ Y(h,m,i)
Q(H,m,i) : Y(H,m,i) ◮ Y(H,M,i) ◮ Y(H,M,I) ◮ Y(H,m,I) ◮ Y(h,m,i)
It is not specified, however, in which order those seats are filled following those
priorities.16
16Although not explicitly stated in the government document, we assume that universities do not give
higher priority to students claiming some privileges for the open access seats (Q(h,m,i)).
